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No hugging, no learning: The limitations of humour 
Tom Cochrane 
 
Forthcoming in the British Journal of Aesthetics 
 
Abstract 
This article claims that the capacity of humorous works to influence our attitudes is limited. 
We can only find something funny if we regard it as norm-YLRODWLQJ LQ DZD\ WKDWGRHVQ¶W
make certain pragmatic demands upon us (e.g. to defend the norm). It is compatible with 
these conditions that humour reinforces an attitude about a norm-violation. However it is not 
compatible with these conditions that we reject some existing attitude. Such a rejection would 
require that we recognize our attitude as norm-violating in a way that has pragmatic force. 
Thus if a humorous work reveals the absurdity of something, we can either find it funny and 
not have our attitudes significantly influenced, or else be significantly influenced but not find 
it funny. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Philosophers of art have sometimes argued that artworks can influence our attitudes. This is 
often taken to involve the depiction of circumstances from a certain perspective, such that 
audiences are disposed to carry that perspective into their everyday lives, and regard real 
things differently as a result (e.g. Young 2001: ch.3; Graham 2005: ch.4).1 This procedure 
may not often have a radical influence. But as part of fully-engaging with a work, we are 
certainly motivated to temporarily adopt the attitudes the work portrays towards its subject 
matter. So for at least the duration of the engagement we experience the pull of seeing the 
world in a certain way. Repeated exposure to such a pull is accordingly quite likely to have 
an impact, and in a few cases we may be quite dramatically affected. 
 
Note that b\µDWWLWXGH¶,PHDQEURDGO\WKHHYDOXDWLYHVWDQFHZHWDNHWRZDUGVVRPHREMHFWRU
state of affairs. Thus while a shift in attitude can be brought about through the acquisition of 
new beliefs, the most direct impact is an affective one. For instance, we shift from being 
afraid of a dog to being reassured by it. Or we shift from a heartfelt commitment towards a 
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political movement to contemptuous rejection. Accordingly, it may often be the affective 
dimension of an artwork that plays the most vital role in shifting our attitudes.2 For example, 
the way that a work like Black Beauty may shift our attitude towards the treatment of horses 
is a function of the tragic light in which their lives are depicted. 
 
A tragic ethos certainly seems apt to urge us with some force to reconsider our attitudes 
towards the world. But how about comedies? Can a humorous work encourage us to change 
our attitude while also getting us to laugh? It is likely that in being amused, the audience may 
for the first time appreciate the absurdity of something. Plausibly this is a central goal of 
satire. However, I claim that the capacity of humour to influence our attitudes is limited by 
the conditions under which we are able to find things funny. I will argue that we can only 
find something funny if we regard it as norm-violating LQ DZD\ WKDWGRHVQ¶WPDNH certain 
cognitive or pragmatic demands upon us (to defend the norm, or to abandon our norm-
commitment). It is compatible with these conditions that humour reinforces our attitude that 
something is norm-violating. However it is not compatible with these conditions that, on the 
basis of finding it funny, we come to reject an existing commitment. Such a rejection would 
require that we recognize our commitment as norm-violating in a way that has pragmatic 
force. Thus if a humorous work reveals the absurdity of something, we can either find it 
funny and not have our attitudes significantly influenced, or else be significantly influenced 
but not find it funny. Other genres do not seem to have such a priori limitations to their 
potential impact upon us. 
 
2. Finding something funny 
To justify my argument I need to first articulate and defend two necessary conditions for the 
experience of finding something funny. 1RWH WKDW ,¶P not trying to characterise what is 
distinctive about the amused response RU ZKDW¶V GLVWLQFWLYH DERXW DPXVLQJ REMHFWV Rather 
,¶Pinterested in identifying a distinct and robust cognitive process or appraisal that gets us 
into the state of finding something funny. Identifying such a process must be at the heart of 
any comprehensive theory of humour however. It will significantly determine what features 
of objects are likely to stimulate amusement, as well point us towards possible functions or 
benefits of amusement.  
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 It is moreover acknowledged that artworks are unreliable sources of new true beliefs (e.g. Gibson 2003; 
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The conditions for amusement that I propose build on the incongruity theory; roughly the 
view that all humour involves recognizing something to be incongruous. This is widely 
believed to be the best candidate for a general theory of humour. One can find hints of it right 
back to Aristotle (in Rhetoric 3.2) and some contemporary formulations are very 
sophisticated (e.g. Morreall 2009; Carroll 2013). Indeed, philosophers have recently 
suggested that the two main competitor theories²the relief and superiority theories²may be 
trying to answer a different question. Achieving relief, or feeling superior to others may be 
understood as values or benefits of humour, rather than the conditions for finding something 
funny (e.g. Jones 2006; Smuts 2006; Zamir 2014). As such they can potentially complement 
rather than contradict incongruity theory. My account in particular will make some 
connections to psychological relief. 
 
However, there are certain key problems for the incongruity theory that have long been 
recognized: 1) the notion of incongruity is too vague and; 2) ZHGRQ¶WKDYHDJRRGGLVWLQFWLRQ
between humorous incongruity and non-humorous incongruity. The two conditions I provide 
are attempts to solve these problems. As mentioned, they are pitched as necessary conditions 
for amusement. Possibly they are also jointly sufficient.3 Though it is evident that factors of 
timing, repeated exposure, relevance, and context play an important role in the arousal of 
amusement, I suspect that these factors facilitate the conditions I propose rather than present 
significant new requirements. At any rate, my argument for the limitations of humour only 
requires that the conditions I propose are agreed to be necessary. 
 
3. Defining incongruity 
As mentioned before, the incongruity theory states that whenever we find something funny, 
we recognize it to be incongruous in some way. When James Beattie first introduced the term, 
he used it in a relatively literal sense to refer to situations where two or more things within an 
assemblage are not congruent, or fitting together (1779: 318). However other writers have 
extended incongruity to include things that are inconsistent, distorted, exaggerated, 
unexpected, unusual, irrelevant, or inappropriate. With all these interpretations on offer, we 
can appreciate why the ability to identify incongruities in all funny things may only be due to 
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its vagueness.4 Pretty much anything could be incongruous in at least one of these respects, 
such that for any putative counter-example, ZH¶OOalways be able find something incongruous 
about it from some point of view. This could make the theory unfalsifiable. 
 
A good formal definition of incongruity comes from Michael Clark (1970), who derives his 
account from Schopenhauer (1844, Vol 1, §13; Vol 2. ch.8). Clark defines incongruity as an 
experience in which we subsume under a concept something WKDWGRHVQ¶t match the things 
typically subsumed under that concept. $ FOHDU FDVH LV ZKHQ WKH LQVWDQFH MXVW GRHVQ¶W IDOO
under the concept at all, as in a category error. However Clark thinks the incongruous 
instance may contrast with typical cases in other ways. Unfortunately KH GRHVQ¶W VSHOO out 
these other ways in any detail. For instance, he says that the incongruous instance may be 
grotesque, HYHQWKRXJKWKLVMXVWVHHPVWREHDQRWKHUZD\RIVD\LQJWKDWLW¶VLQFRQJUXRXV 
 
My preferred specification of incongruity is that the object is construed as violating a norm. 
This is not unique to me. We see appeals to norms in John Morreall (2009) and Noël 
&DUUROO¶VZRUNDVZHOODVWKHSV\FKRORJLVWV3HWHU0F*UDZDQG&DOHE:DUUHQ
who propose what they call a µbenign violation¶ theory. The appeal to norms has notable 
advantages. First, norms are relative to the social and psychological background of the 
individual, helping us to make sense of the subjective and culturally variable nature of 
humour. Second, violations can be more or less intense (rHODWLYH WR RQH¶V EDFNJround 
commitments) giving us one way to explain different intensities of amusement. Third, there is 
plausibly a common psychological mechanism for detecting norms and their violation across 
the various moral, social and practical domains in which we find humour. This could allow 
for the existence of a distinctive psychological mechanism for arousing humour. 
 
However, norms can be understood in several different ways, so it is important to be clear 
about what sort of norm-violations we are talking about. The first distinction is between 
norms concerning how something generally is (statistical norms) and norms for how 
something ought to be (rule-based norms). It is only the latter kind I appeal to, where some 
sort of rule or constraining force is in play. The second distinction is between norms that are 
grounded in non-intentional nature, such as the laws of physics or teleological norms 
regarding the morphology of living creatures, and norms that are grounded in intentional 
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actions or attitudes. Again I appeal only to the latter. 
 
Naturally any attempt to more narrowly specify the theory in this way will bring with it the 
risk of counter-examples. Consider for instance the following well-replicated experiment by 
Goran Nerhardt (1970): Nerhardt had individuals pick up a series of identical looking weights, 
the last of which was either much lighter or much heavier than the rest. Picking up this last 
weight elicited laughter, indicating that amusement may have been found in the violation of a 
statistical norm.5 In my defence however, I think it just as likely that the participants saw 
humour in the way they were tricked; they radically underestimated or exceeded the effort 
required by the task, where the operative QRUPLVWRPDNHRQH¶VHIIRUWSURSRUtional to the task. 
 
Meanwhile the exclusion of teleological norms and laws of physics may be controversial 
because violations of these norms are often found in cartoons. However, as far as I can tell, 
we never see humour based exclusively on such violations. Rather, physical violations 
contribute in some way to the violation of a rule grounded in intentional actions or attitudes. 
For instance, a man with one leg longer than the other keeps walking in circles. Or consider 
when Wile E. Coyote runs off a cliff and fails to obey the law of gravity until he realises what 
has happened. &OHDUO\WKHODZVRISK\VLFVKDYHEHHQYLRODWHGKHUHEXWDEVHQWWKHFKDUDFWHU¶V
grossly accidental behaviour, I think we would find the scene miraculous rather than funny. 
Thus I suggest that we primarily engage with the scene as an aim-based violation. 
 
Finally ugliness is often funny (e.g. gurning and the ugliest dog in the world competitions). 
,VQ¶W WKLV D WHOHRORJLFDO YLRODWLRQ" , DGPLW WKLV LV D WULFN\ FDVH. However one definite 
intentional norm that is probably in play (in amusing cases) concerns grooming and public 
presentation. That is, it is funny to pull ugly faces when the norm is to present oneself as 
attractive. I would add that it should not be very surprising if people sometimes take cases of 
natural ugliness to be blameworthy. 
 
Overall, the norm-violation condition LV FRPSDUDEOH WR &ODUN¶V DSSURDFK LQ WKDW WR ILQG
something funny, we must view that thing in relation to a concept that it does not standardly 
fit. That is, we must understand a certain way (or limited range of ways) one ought to behave 
relative to a type of activity in a type of context (e.g. how one ought to speak, how one ought 
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to dress). This then allows us to experience the object of amusement as in some way wrong 
(even if we find it hard to articulate how exactly it is wrong). However the norm-violation 
view is more precise WKDQ &ODUN¶V YLHZ because LW GRHVQ¶W FRYHU VRPH RI WKH ZD\V WKDW
LQFRQJUXLWLHV FRXOG EH DGPLWWHG RQ &ODUN¶V DFFRXQW Most importantly, YLRODWLRQV GRQ¶W
simply contrast with the norm-fitting cases; they are more definitely contra-indicated by the 
norm. Second, norm-violations are not necessarily unexpected or surprising. Certainly norm-
violations are quite likely to be unexpected, but many of the things we find funny are quite 
predictable. Third, the norm-YLRODWLRQGRHVQ¶WKDYHWREHrare. It could be extremely common, 
as in cases where a comedian points out some common folly of human behaviour. All this 
DOORZV IRU YHU\ VXEWOH FDVHV RI KXPRXU ZKHUH VRPHRQH¶V EHKDYLRXU LVQ¶W HYHQ SDUWLFXODUO\
XQXVXDO6RORQJDVRQH¶VDWWHQWLRQLVGUDZQWRZDUGVWKHZD\WKHQRUPLVEHLQJYLRODWHGWKH
SHUVRQ¶VEHKDYLRXUFRXOGjust be a little bit rude or awkward. 
 
My constraints on the relevant norm-violations still leaves a great deal of latitude, since it 
covers practical norms (if one wants x, then one ought to y), moral norms, social conventions, 
norms for mental actions (e.g. believing or reasoning) and certain constitutive norms for 
category membership (e.g. what counts as a legal move in chess). Violations of any of these 
kinds of norms is a potential source of humour. For example, puns violate linguistic norms, 
dirty jokes violate norms of propriety, Tom and Jerry cartoons violate norms of physical 
harm, and meta-jokes violate norms for telling jokes.6 Indeed there is an enormous and ever-
growing number of intentional norms, and audiences cannot always be relied to bring the 
expected norm to bear. For instance, I think a key reason why clowns are often not funny for 
mature audiences is because we subsume the clown under the norm for clown behaviour. As 
D UHVXOW ZH GRQ¶W H[SHULHQFH the clown as violating everyday dress codes or standards of 
bodily grace, but as satisfying the norms for how clowns ought to appear and behave. 
 
Finally, my account allows for three distinctive ways to violate a norm. 1) One can violate a 
norm by failing to live up to it. This corresponds to humour based on stupidity and 
incompetence. 2) One can actively oppose a norm. This corresponds to humour based on 
rudeness or immoral behaviour. 3) One can also exceed a norm for performance (relative to a 
type of individual). 7KLVFRUUHVSRQGV WRFDVHVRIKXPRXUZKHUH DFKDUDFWHU¶VH[WUDRUGLQDU\
                                                 
6
 (JDPDQZDONVLQWRDEDU«+H¶VDQDOFRKROLFDQGLW¶VGestroying his family. 
7 
 
success or facility is amusing.7  
 
4. Amusing Incongruities 
The claim that all things we find amusing are viewed as violating a norm is a starting point, 
but further specification is required to do justice the experience of finding something funny. 
There are many things that we can find norm violating without finding them funny. Examples 
include murders, physical anomalies, and surrealist works of art (cf. Bain 1875: 282-3). This 
is the second key problem for the incongruity theory: how to distinguish the amusing 
incongruities from the non-amusing ones. 
 
A plausible condition, though not one I endorse, is to rule out those sorts of norm violation 
that are the object of a negative emotion like fear or anger. Thus it is common to suggest that 
the incongruity KDVDOVRWREHµQRQ-WKUHDWHQLQJ¶LQVRPH VHQVHKHQFHWKHµEHQLJQLW\¶RI the 
benign violation theory). The thought here seems to be that if the incongruity directly 
undermines some concern of ours, the relevant emotional responses of fear or anger will 
inhibit the response of amusement. 
 
The problem I have with this condition is that merely specifying that the incongruity must be 
non-threatening does not give us a variety of incongruity that positively invites amusement. It 
is not very plausible to claim that, as a default, we will find incongruities amusing so long as 
additional factors of threat, loss or offence are absent. Rather the most plausible default 
attitude to take towards incongruities seems to be puzzlement or curiosity.  
 
In order to avoid puzzlement, we need some positive condition that explains how we manage 
to enjoy the incongruity. This is the condition advanced by Clark (1970) and more recently 
endorsed by Marmysz (2003: Chapter 7) and Morreall (2009: 15). How could we enjoy 
incongruities? One idea is that we feel psychological reward in the acquisition of information, 
and that resolving incongruity is a means to this (e.g. Schultz 1976, Kulka 2007). For 
example, puns might be funny because we realize the alternate possible meaning of a word in 
the context presented, and we effectively learn something rather surprising. 
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 For instance, the film Pleasantville (1998) is thematically based on humour of this type. Many characters are 
excessively nice. Meanwhile in one scene the bemused protagonist finds that no matter how he throws a 
basketball it always falls perfectly into the basket. This violates a rule for human intentional action. 
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However this account cannot be right because there are plenty of jokes which do not invite 
the resolution of incongruity. For instance, take the following joke: 
 
4:KDW¶V\HOORZDQGGDQJHURXV" 
A: Shark infested custard. 
 
If the suggestion is that we get pleasure from resolving incongruities then one might say that 
it pleases us to discover that it is indeed the case that shark-infested custard is both yellow 
and dangerous. But that kind of account would ignore the patent ridiculousness of what is 
described. ,IWKHUH¶s any resolution here, it immediately gives way to the deeper incongruity 
of how sharks manage to get into your custard (cf. Carroll 2005: 163-164). So regardless of 
whether it is possible, shark-infested custard remains highly absurd, and it is the sheer 
absurdity of that thought that makes it funny. 
 
A better view is that we enjoy the incongruity as an incongruity. This better captures the 
phenomenology of humour, where we simply delight in the thing itself. Indeed, I agree with 
Morreall that humour qualifies as a distinctive kind of aesthetic experience; we value the 
incongruity for its own sake.8  Moreover our amusement is bound up with the intensity, 
subtlety or inventiveness of the norm-violation; traditional aesthetic virtues. 
 
However, there are non-humorous cases of incongruity that satisfy even this condition. Mike 
Martin is particularly strong on this point. He notes that when we admire surreal paintings we 
enjoy their surreal properties for their own sake. Similarly, Martin relates a case described by 
Freud, in which a foot fetishist became sexually excited upon seeing a scraggy and 
incongruously shaped foot (1983: 77-78). 
 
1RZLW¶VZRUWKQRWLQJWKDWDORWRIVXUUHDOLVWDUWLVH[FOXGHGE\P\VWLSXODWLRQWKDWKXPRURXV
norm-violations cannot rely exclusively on teleological norms (e.g. the distended legs of the 
HOHSKDQWVLQ'DOL¶VThe Temptation of St Anthony 1946). However there are surrealist works 
WKDWGRQ¶WUHO\RQVXFKYLRODWLRQV&RQVLGHUIRULQVWDQFH 0DJULWWH¶VYoung Girl Eating a Bird 
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 In contrast some philosophers argue that amusement is DQHPRWLRQ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HYHQLIWKHUHDOLW\
of some cases of humour (such as an insightful caricature) can be a source of additional pleasure. Another way 
to put this is that unlike the case of being emotionally aroused by fictions, it is not philosophically puzzling to 
be amused by fictions. 
9 
 
(1927). Similarly, while certain aspects of IHWLVKLVW¶VH[FLWHPHQWPD\EHIRFXVHGRQWKHIRRW¶V
teleological violation, he may also be stimulated by the thought of breaking social norms. 
 
I think that as the literature on comedy currently stands, there is still no good response to 
these sorts of counter-examples. 0RUUHDOO¶V XOWLPDWH VROXWLRQ LV WR VD\ WKDW KXPRURXV
incongruity is just that kind of incongruity that gets us to laugh (2009: 73-75). But this is to 
VKLIWWRDGLIIHUHQWLVVXHFRQFHUQLQJZKDWLVGLVWLQFWLYHDERXWWKHKXPRXUUHVSRQVH,WGRHVQ¶W
help us to discern the conditions for finding something funny (cf. Smuts 2006). Meanwhile 
Noël Carroll (2013) stipulates that the incongruity VKRXOGQ¶WSX]]OHXV RU DQQR\XV. But a 
deeper account should explain how we manage not to be puzzled or annoyed by the 
incongruity. 
 
5. Non-seriousness 
There is a general approach to this problem that I believe is promising. A number of 
philosophers and psychologists have placed humour within the category of play behaviour 
(e.g. Kant 1790 Part I, §54; Eastman 1930; Morreall 2009; Apter & Smith 1977; Martin 
2007). This seems to be inspired by the case of tickling, which some believe to be a form of 
play fighting. The idea is that we manage to shift into a playful mode of thought, where we 
are no longer practically, emotionally engaged with the world in the same way.9 
  
I think this is the way to go, but it needs to be carefully articulated if it is to exclude surreal or 
fantastical art. After all, surrealist works might also be considered playful explorations of 
reality. As such, my proposal for the playful mode of engagement is to appeal to a definite 
sense of non-seriousness. From a certain perspective, it sounds trivially true that to find 
something funny is to find it non-serious. However, the substantive point is to think about the 
factors that encourage us to take a norm-violation seriously and then undermine these in the 
case of humour. 
 
In the previous section I argued that comedy brings into play intentional norms concerning 
how one ought to behave. Intentional norms are generally psychologically taxing. Unlike 
statistical norms, we have to live up to intentional norms or hold others up to them. 
Furthermore, when norms are violated this typically calls for some kind of pragmatic 
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response. A violation threatens the norm. We normally respond to such threats by correcting 
or condemning the violation, or at least taking heed not to commit such a violation ourselves. 
An alternative pragPDWLF UHVSRQVH LV WRFKDQJHRQH¶s mind about the status of the norm; to 
regard norm-compliance as untenable, or undesirable. This sort of thinking is as true of 
fictional presentations as real life presentations. It is, for instance, characteristic of dramas to 
raise such issues. What I suggest is unique about humour however, is that we are released 
from the very pragmatic demands that would normally be raised by the apparent norm-
violation. This is because we realise that the violation is not a serious one. The relief from 
this demand can help explain why humour is intrinsically pleasurable.10 
 
So far, this additional necessary condition should be reminiscent of the proposal that the 
violation be non-puzzling or non-threatening. However the notion of a cognitive or pragmatic 
demand giving way to playful mode of appreciation is more specific.11 In particular, I think 
we can specify a process whereby the norm-violation is construed as non-serious by means of 
an appraisal or inference that is made about the violation. I shall outline this appraisal in two 
steps. 
 
First we appraise whether or not a norm has been intentionally violated. The determination 
here depends on the prima facie appearance of the violation. In particular, it is not to be 
confused with a more reflective recognition of a factual difference between humour produced 
intentionally and humour produced accidentally. Whether the source of humour is a fiction, a 
professional comedy performance, or a happening from everyday life, we judge initially 
whether the scenario with which we are presented involves (or depicts) someone either 
accidentally or deliberately violating a norm.  
 
If the norm-violation is regarded as accidental (e.g. trying but failing to live up to a norm) 
then it can only be experienced as non-serious if we also determine that it is not the kind of 
violation that we are required either to guard against or to correct (at the time of amusement). 
For instance, in the Woody Allen film Take the Money and Run (1969), 9LUJLO¶V bid to escape 
prison with a gun made out of soap is foiled when it starts to rain. There is no demand here to 
take careful note in case we should fall into such error ourselves. Thus the nature of the 
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violation itself here is not the kind that encourages pragmatic concern. Alternatively, the lack 
of a pragmatic demand may be drawn largely from our own indifference. For instance, a lot 
of cruel humour trades off our sense of immunity to certain failings. Audiences laugh at fat 
people, or cats falling off ledges when they perceive such instances (rightly or wrongly) as 
violations to which they are invulnerable, and which moreover they lack any responsibility to 
correct. 
 
Note the way in which this condition can exclude certain non-amusing accidents. For 
example, car crashes are accidental norm-violations. But we may judge ourselves to be 
vulnerable to such errors. We may also feel disposed to provide assistance. Consider in 
contrast a driver checking extremely carefully before pulling onto the highway only to be 
suddenly struck by a meteorite. This violation of road safety is so beyond the pale WKDWLW¶VQRW
the kind of failing we need to guard against, and so it is potentially funny. 
 
Meanwhile, if we appraise a norm to have been deliberately violated (e.g. someone acting 
rudely) then it needs to be clear that we are not invited to take the norm-violation as a 
potential candidate for endorsement, or something that genuinely places the norm in doubt.12 
It looks like the principal way this works is if we can come to construe the norm-violation as 
unreal in some way. For example, it can be funny when a child is naïvely offensive, because 
we recognize both that a norm has been actively violated and that no malicious intent is 
actually in play.13 Much dark humour similarly seems to function in this way. We may be 
presented with all kinds of outrageous or immoral behaviours but it is understood that the 
DXWKRUGRHVQ¶W really want people to behave in such ways, or that such behaviours should in 
real life go unpunished.14 
 
Finally, cases where a norm is exceeded can come in either intentional or unintentional 
varieties and the same basic conditions apply as specified above. Thus, cases where someone 
accidentally exceeds a norm, (e.g. when Tobey Maguire in Pleasantville scores the basket no 
matter where he throws the ball) appear so improbably lucky that we experience no demand 
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propriety, but of course they are completely absent any prurient intention.  
14
 Note that some norm-violations may be regarded by the audience as so extreme that regardless of signals that 
they are not really endorsed, we take them to have genuine norm-violating repercussions, and so we take them 
seriously. 
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to abandon or update our standards for human behaviour. Meanwhile, cases where a character 
satisfies their intention (such as the precocious little girl who knows all about brain surgery in 
The Man with Two Brains) are regarded as unreal. 
 
It is important to reiterate that experiencing a deliberate norm-violation as unreal is not the 
same as witnessing a fictional character violate a norm. The Godfather is fictionally norm-
violating, but is not generally amusing. This is EHFDXVH RQFH ZH¶UH VLWXDWHG LPDJLQDWLYHO\
within the fictional world, we are typically encouraged to take what is presented as if it is not 
fictional. Thus when fictional characters are funny, it can be because their norm-violations 
fall into the accidental type outlined above. Alternatively, the fiction takes an extra step to 
signal the unrealLW\RIWKHFKDUDFWHU¶VEHKDYLRXU. 
 
,W¶VZRUWKQRWLQJthat an impression of the non-seriousness can be stimulated more easily in 
fictions than it can be in real-life. For instance, background cues such as light-hearted music, 
the absence of normal reactions in other characters, or even the mere knowledge of engaging 
with a comic work can signal the unreality of an active norm-violation. Thus we can often 
find behavioural norm-violations to be amusing in fictional contexts that in real life might be 
disturbing or offensive (cf. Carroll 2013: 81-82). A similar thought is often expressed with 
the notion of comic distance. Distance is when the reality of a chaUDFWHU¶V VXIIHULQJ or the 
consequences of that suffering are downplayed. This factor can contribute equally to the 
sense that a deliberate violation is unreal or that an accidental violation is not one that needs 
to be guarded against. 
 
In general, the ways in which we pick up on such comic cues are potentially complex and 
subtle, and it is beyond the scope of this paper to fully explore them. However it is quite 
possible for the comedy to present everything in a quasi-serious manner, and for the content 
of the norm-violation itself to be implausibly construed as something that makes pragmatic 
demands upon us due to its highly exaggerated or self-defeating nature. 
 
There was a recent news story that illustrates this point quite well. An Irish women had a job 
application to a teaching agency in South Korea rejected. Apparently the agency sent her an 
HPDLOVD\LQJ³I am sorry to inform you that my client does not hire Irish people due to the 
alcoholism nature of your kind.´7KHZRPDQZDVUHSRUWHGDVVD\LQJ³When I got the email, it 
was so abrupt and short. I actually laXJKHG ZKHQ , UHDG LW LQLWLDOO\«´ (McCauley 2014). 
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What we see here is that the woman initially took the response to be so grossly in error that it 
was not plausibly the product of a genuinely offensive intention. Immediately after this 
however, she realised that they really meant it, so her amusement switched to anger. 
 
Similarly, there are conditions where a violation can shift from appearing not to make 
pragmatic or cognitive demands to making them. For instance, if a comedian were to persist 
in his or her norm-violation outside of the performance context, it would normally stop being 
funny. Persistence, particularly in the face of correction, undermines the interpretation of the 
norm-violation as either unreal or inconsequentially accidental. It is for similar reasons that if 
violating behaviour is attributed to a mental disability, a sensitive audience will not find it 
funny anymore. In such cases the individual is seen as acting in earnest or genuinely 
struggling to avoid error. Any norm-violations that occur are thus neither unreal nor non-
seriously accidental. 
 
6. Dealing with counter-examples 
If the above account is correct, we have conditions that distinguish non-humorous 
incongruities from humorous incongruities. We only find something funny if it is viewed as 1) 
norm-violating 2) in a manner that is determined to be non-serious. Note that these two 
conditions are in tension with each other. We more readily take norm-violations seriously 
than non-seriously. So in order to deliver non-seriousness, one might be tempted to reduce 
the degree of norm-violation. But it seems the best comedy will maximally combine norm-
violation and non-seriousness, and that is hard to do. 
 
Let us now see how this proposal deals with potential counter-examples. The condition of 
non-seriousness rules out the fetishist case, since the fetishist not only experiences the 
scraggy foot as norm-violating, but also desires or endorses that violation. Thus there is a 
positive sense in which the fetishist wants the scraggy foot to be real or non-accidental; they 
have serious intentions towards the violation. 
 
Meanwhile, in surrealist works like Young Girl Eating a Bird, the JLUO¶VEHKDYLRXUdoes not 
appear to be accidental, so we treat it as an intentional norm-violation. However, we do not 
detect signs or nudges that the scene is to be treated as unreal (within the confines of 
engaging with a fiction). On the contrary, we may judge that Magritte intends to disturb us 
14 
 
with a genuine possibility. Thus we do not find the painting funny.15 
 
Another potential counter-example to my model concerns our capacity to be amused in 
circumstances that are in fact threatening to us. For instance, I have sometimes found 
occasion to laugh at myself while suffering some wretchedly sick condition or painful dental 
surgery (at least for a few seconds). While this scenario may violate a norm, in what sense 
can it be regarded as non-serious? The existence of gallows humour similarly suggests that 
humour can be found in the darkest of circumstances.16 
 
Cases of suffering like this qualify as unintentional norm-violations on my account, 
specifically the failure to protect oneself from harm, or to avoid peril. Non-seriousness should 
accordingly come from the loss of a demand to correct or guard against the violation. Thus I 
suggest that one is at least momentarily able to distance oneself from the pragmatic 
commitment to avoid RQH¶V suffering; to admit RQH¶V KHOSOHVVQHVV Note that one can still 
regard RQH¶V suffering as a bad thing. Yet temporarily, one does not experience the demand to 
do anything about it because one construes oneself as hopelessly incompetent to do so. 
Similarly, we often laugh at scenarios that result in pain (even to ourselves) and death (to 
others at least) so long as magnificent stupidity is displayed. Consider for instance the 
Darwin Award, a comic award given to people who remove themselves from the gene pool as 
a result of immense idiocy. The errors highlighted here are so foolish that all pragmatic 
implications are obviated. There is nothing to learn here.17 
 
A final sort of counter-example follows from the observation that many comedians seem to 
be trying to convey a serious message by means of their routines or comic fictions. How is 
this compatible with the apparently non-serious nature of humorous norm-violations? 
Arguing that comedies are indeed limited in their capacities to change our attitudes is 
precisely the bullet I want to bite. Thus I will address this point in detail in the following 
section. I will allow that comedies can teach us to some extent while simultaneously getting 
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 Other Magritte works are more definitely amusing. For instance, the reverse mermaid depicted in Collective 
Invention (1934) seems to me to be helplessly floundering. Thus it is failing to live up to a practical norm in a 
manner that does not call upon me to guard against or correct the violation. 
16
 Along similar lines, it may also be objected that there are cases where we find something funny despite, or 
even because laughter is normatively discouraged. Such cases do not affect my account. The psychological 
conditions for finding something funny are distinct from considerations regarding whether one ought to find it 
funny. 
17
 This is not to deny that we might fluctuate between amusement and feelings or pity or sadness. Sometimes 
humour can be in tension with other feelings. 
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us to laugh, but that there are definite limitations to this capacity. Thus comedians wanting to 
convey a serious message may not be employing the most effective means to do so. 
 
7. Learning from comedy 
The general model of cognitive influence that I introduced at the beginning of this paper is 
that by expressing a certain attitude towards an object, a work encourages us to adopt this 
attitude for at least the duration of the artistic engagement, and potentially carry that same 
attitude into our non-artistic lives. Since comedies work with norm-violations in particular, it 
is attitudes towards these norms that will be particularly in play. 
 
In general, a norm must be at least implicitly grasped prior to the comic event for us to be 
able to detect its violation in the object of amusement. A comedy may thereby draw our 
attention towards this norm in a way that reinforces our commitment. That is, we appreciate 
more keenly what is right by contrast with what is wrong. I will not deny that this qualifies as 
a form of influence. However, my arguments about the limitations of humour concern to what 
H[WHQWWKHUH¶VDQRSSRUWXQLW\WRFKDQJHRUUHYHUVHan attitude. On the basis of the conditions 
for humour I have outlined, I will examine two possible cases: 1) we newly adopt the attitude 
that something is non-seriously norm-violating and; 2) we newly adopt a non-serious attitude 
towards something we already regard as norm-violating.18 ,¶OO GHDO ZLWK WKH VHFRQG, less 
radical, possibility first. 
 
7.1 The non-seriousness of a norm-violation 
Cases where we acquire a non-serious attitude towards something we took to be an 
intentional violation are rather limited in their significance. An illustrative example is where 
a friend plays a trick, like jumping out from behind a bush, and it takes a few moments to 
UHDOLVHLW¶VRQO\a trick. More generally, if what is newly appreciated or learned is supposed to 
be that an apparently deliberate norm-violation is in fact unreal or pretend, then this seems 
less a case of significant influence than a case where an earlier shift of attitude (to regard 
something as intentionally violating) is undermined or defeated. At best one might learn not 
to trust norm-violating appearances (or RQH¶V friend) so much. 
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 A third possibility²that we learn the norm-violating status of something we already regard as non-serious²
can be quickly dismissed. Non-seriousness is supposed to be a mode or manner that the norm-violation takes. 
Accordingly it does not strictly manifest prior to noticing the norm-violation, although background cues might 
dispose us to view novel norm-violations as non-serious. 
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Cases where an accidental norm-violation is newly regarded as non-serious are somewhat 
more significant. This corresponds to certain forms of satire. For instance, we may already 
regard a SROLWLFLDQ¶VDFWLRQWREHPLVJXLGHGwhen a satire presents their behaviour as absurdly 
self-defeating or grossly incompetent. Here a pre-existing disdain for the politician is likely to 
be strengthened.19 However, according to my model, the most distinctive import of comedy is 
that we feel no need to guard against or correct such errors. Naturally, if we already feel 
disdain for the politician, we do not want him or her running our country. My point is that 
amusement will not spur or add any heat to such an implication. The attitude of amusement 
itself expresses something more akin to indifference. 
 
It might be suggested that mockery can have indirect implications. That is, we present an 
exaggerated case in which the politician¶s act is obviously violating in order to draw the 
DXGLHQFHV¶DWWHQWLRQWRZDUGVDOHVVH[DJJHUDWHGQRUP-violation which ought to be corrected. 
This coheres with the observation that in comedy our attention is generally drawn towards the 
norm in play. However, the implication that the target of RQH¶V mockery needs to be 
genuinely corrected seems fragile while still encouraging an audience to laugh. Any 
implication that a serious norm-violation is in play is a reason not to laugh. It can thereby 
undermine the comic ethos. 
 
Compare this with cases where one might learn something about oneself: If someone mocks 
me for dropping a ball by exaggerating my clumsiness, the indirect implication that I really 
ought not to drop the ball may be clearly suggested, but LIWKDW¶VVR I am not encouraged to 
laugh at myself. On the other hand, if I do feel encouraged to laugh at myself, I can regard 
myself as free from liability. Either the mistake is understood to be so obvious WKDWWKHUH¶VQR
need to make a note about avoiding such errors in the future, or else my incompetence is so 
WRWDOWKDWWKHUH¶VQRUHDOLVWLFSURVSHFWIRUFRUUHFWLRQ (cf. the pain avoidance cases considered 
in the previous section).20 Either way, although attention is drawn towards the norm, no 
practical steps towards guarding against the error are demanded.  
 
7.2 Both a norm-violation and non-serious 
Let us turn now to the case in which we newly come to regard something as both norm-
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 This claim is supported by empirical studies into the impact of satire. See Becker (2014), Esralew & Young 
(2012), and Gruner (1995). 
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 7KLVDQDO\VLVDOVRDSSOLHVZKHQRQHODXJKVDWRQHVHOIIRUDVLOO\HUURUOLNHVHDUFKLQJIRURQH¶VJODVVHVRQO\WR
ILQGWKHPRQRQH¶VRZQKHDG 
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violating and non-seriously so. We need only be concerned with accidental norm-violations 
here. Learning of a non-serious deliberate violation does not differ significantly from the case 
in which we learn only non-VHULRXVQHVV0HDQZKLOHLWGRHVQ¶WPDNHPXFKVHQVHWROHDUQRI
RQH¶VRZQEHOLHIVRUDFWLRQVWKDWWKH\are unreal intentional violations. 
 
By way of considering the prospects of significant attitude change in comedy, let us examine 
the example of Life of Brian. It might be claimed that this widely admired comic film could 
potentially reveal to a Christian the absurdity of their religious commitment. The argument 
might go as follows:  
 
(1) In Life of Brian, numerous individuals in the film develop religious commitments in a 
manner that is obviously unjustified. We are encouraged to laugh at their religious 
commitments. 
(2) If we regard what is depicted as sufficiently resembling real-life historical circumstances, 
we are encouraged to similarly laugh at real-life religious commitments; to view them as 
absurd. 
(3) If we hold religious commitments, taking on the invited attitude towards religious 
commitments, even temporarily, could encourage a significant change of mind.  
 
1RZ LW VKRXOG EH QRWHG WKDW WKH µPHVVDJH¶ Vupported by a work of art is rarely as 
unambiguous as I have assumed here. Indeed parts of the film suggest that Jesus would be the 
merited target of religious devotion. However, given that some people do come to interpret 
the film as supporting the more radical rejection of religious commitment, it seems 
theoretically possible for a fairly similar film to unambiguously support the more radical 
message.  
 
So suppose that I interpret Life of Brian as bearing such a radical message, while also holding 
a definite religious commitment. The film invites me to regard religious commitment in 
general as funny, that is, as a non-serious norm-violation. The direct implication is that my 
own religious commitment is so clearly norm-YLRODWLQJ WKDW LW GRHVQ¶W QHHG WR EH Juarded 
against or corrected. However, since my religious commitment is something I definitely 
endorse, I cannot construe it as a hopeless error, or an easily avoided mistake. Even if I 
agreed that my attitude is norm-violating, that is a very serious violation with which I must 
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pragmatically engage. Thus I cannot both take on the invited attitude and be amused, even 
temporarily. 
 
If the religious committed viewer agrees that the comedy has hit the mark, they are more 
likely to experience humiliation than amusement. In time, this humiliation may pass, and the 
individual may be able to laugh wholeheartedly at his or her past errors. Yet humiliation must 
come first, and this process will be more lengthy and more painful the more strongly one is 
committed to the attitude that is held up to ridicule. There is a similar process where 
consequences reveal incontestably that you have acted in a stupid manner. It takes time 
EHIRUHRQHFDQORRNEDFNRQRQH¶VLGLRFLHVZLWKDPXVHPHQW 
 
Meanwhile it is worth noting that mockery is a highly unreliable stimulus to attitude change. 
It is at least equally common for the individual to be outraged by such a brazen attack upon 
his or her commitments. The attack may even encourage a defensive response in which the 
LQGLYLGXDO¶V]HDOLVVWUHQJWKHQHGAfter all, it is rarely if ever the case that comedies present 
careful refutations of a particular world view. 
 
Another possible response is that the viewer distances themselves from the attitude that is 
being mocked. A religiously committed viewer may well interpret Life of Brian as inviting 
one to laugh at the way in which these particular people in these particular circumstances 
form their religious commitments. Accepting the absurdity of that specific behaviour is 
compatible with continuing to support the formation of religious commitments more 
generally. But of course, this would entail that significant influence is unavailable, since the 
audience avoids drawing the more radical interpretation of the work. 
 
The final possibility is that the viewer laughs along because they do not take themselves to 
have any considered commitment to the practice held up to ridicule. We see this quite a lot 
where comedians point out common human follies. Often they do so by caricaturing an 
exaggeratedly misguided intention at work. But in actual fact, most people engage in the folly 
without the sort of intention identified by the comic. For example, it is common to lean to the 
side when watching someone trying to putt a golf ball. A comedian might point out the 
absurdity of expecting our behaviour to have any influence on the ball. However, people 
GRQ¶WOHDQZKHQZDWFKLQJWKHJROIEDOOZLWKWKHH[SOLFLWLQWHQWLRQWKDWGRLQJVRZLOODIIHFWWKH
EDOO¶VSDWK7KH\GRVRXQUHIOHFWLYHO\PHUHO\DVDPDQLIHVWDWLRQRIWKHGHVLUHRUH[SHFWDWLRQ
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that the ball should move in the corresponding way. As such, the audience that laughs at such 
an observation does not experience a demand to give up a considered commitment. They 
understand that if they were to have such intentions they would be grossly incompetent, but 
WKH\ GRQ¶W UHJDUG WKHPVHOYHV DV KDYLQJ VXFK intentions. 7KXV DJDLQ WKHUH LVQ¶W PXFK RI D
significant learning experience here. 
 
In order to see the likelihood of these various responses, it may be helpful to consider a case 
analogous to the Life of Brian case: Suppose a comedy invites one to laugh at people who 
believe the world is round. Such a belief is absurd. Many people may believe the world is 
URXQGEXW WKDW¶VGXH WRDn accident that all right-thinking people can easily dismiss if they 
DUHQ¶WKRSHOHVVO\ LQFRPSHWHQW. Now, assuming one does agree the world is round, one can 
respond in one of two ways: The most likely response is to GHQ\ WKHUH¶V DQ invitation to 
abandon RQH¶VEHOLHIRQH judges the target of the humour not to be the real commitment to a 
round world). Alternatively one construes the comedy as genuinely suggesting that the real 
ZRUOGLVQ¶WURXQGEXWone does not feel invited to laugh. Instead the comic suggestion seems 
bizarre or annoying. 
 
Now it might be possible with patient reasoning or demonstration to convince one that the 
world is not round, and at that point one may be in a position to laugh at RQH¶V previous belief. 
%XW¶V WKDW D VHULRXVPDWWHUSimilarly, to be able to regard religious commitment as a non-
serious error, one must first come around to the idea that religious commitment is wrong. 
However, suppose one comes to regard religious commitment, in general, as wrong. Now the 
influence afforded by the comedy is less significant. At best, RQH¶V attitude may be reinforced, 
because it suggests that something one already regards as wrong is non-seriously wrong. This 
would correspond to the first sort of influence I described above. 
 
Overall, the more I am committed to an attitude, i.e. the more significant the prospect of 
giving it up would be, the less possible it is for me to regard its wrongness as amusing. Thus 
the conditions under which comedy might afford significant attitude change invite 
humiliation rather than amusement. And the conditions under which the individual can laugh 
entails that the ways in which he or she could be affected is strictly limited in significance. In 
other artistic genres, the serious implications of a lesson do not seem such a barrier to 
adopting the attitude the genre is inviting one to take. 
 
